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ABSTRACT
The neoclassical theory of employment fails to apply to modern capitalism since it
claims that unemployment is necessary all voluntary. Its problems are pointed out by
Keynes. But, if we look at Keynes’s system, we find that an essential explanation
about why modern capitalism suffers from weak demand is not provided. To answer
this question an alternative consumption theory is needed. Levine’s consumption
theory well explains the condition of under-consumption. Furthermore, a deep
problem of capitalism reveals itself: the production format and the distribution pattern
of capitalism result in a huge income discrepancy between the working-class and the
capitalist-class and its consequence, according to Levine’s consumption theory, is an
overall weak demand. The demand problem might be an inherent weakness of
capitalism which cannot be cured within its structure. However, we still see the bright
side of capitalism that is its influential stimulation mechanism, which provides more
transformational growth – the driving force behind the progress of human civilization
- than any other social structure. Unexpectedly, we become trapped in a dilemma.
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Introduction

Since the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis in late 2006, the unemployment rate has
been soaring high in the United States. It looks like every economic crisis in
capitalism has been accompanied by a slump of the employment rate, which Keynes
attributes to the failure of effective demand. Bailout plans were thus carried out by the
government, but five years have passed and the unemployment rate is still high by
historical standards. It is obviously not the first time that Keynesians policy has failed
to be applied to major economic crises. However, within the discipline of economics,
very few helpful contents of unemployment theory can be found: the main stream of
economics before Keynes views unemployment as a voluntary phenomenon, but the
majority of unemployment we experience in modern capitalism is better characterized
as involuntary. The neoclassical theory of voluntary employment is incorrect, but the
fact that Keynesian policies, even when they are applied, cannot permanently cure for
under-consumption warrants further reflection: weak demand and involuntary
unemployment can be characterized as an inherent weakness of capitalism, whose ills
can hardly be cured within such a structure.
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Chapter One
The Neoclassical Theory of Employment and its Problems
Neoclassical macroeconomic theories were basically constructed on neoclassical
economists’ faith in the power of the market, which was first introduced by Adam
Smith in his Wealth of Nations. They extend Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand”
that they thought would guide and push every element in the market toward their
optimum conditions. That is to say, the market will automatically adjust the economy
to operate at its most efficient format and simultaneously provide the most satisfaction
to its participants.
In fact, the theory of employment drew very little emphasis in neoclassical theories.
Professor Pigou’s ideas in his Theory of Unemployment might be the only systematic
theory of employment that can be found in the entire neoclassical system before
Keynes.[1] Its subordinate position might surprise many economists nowadays
because the problem of unemployment has been a pivotal and onerous economic
problem from which every economy has been suffering. However, by understanding
the way that neoclassical economists conceive unemployment, people will find out
that unemployment, at any rate, is not a social problem. Although the theory of
employment in the neoclassical system had been refuted by Keynes in his The
General Theory, it still provides a way to reflect upon the problems of unemployment.
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The neoclassical theory of employment
Neoclassical theory of employment is fundamentally built on two “objective
assumptions”: 1.The marginal productivity of labor is diminishing as the number of
laborers working on fixed capitals (or land) increases; 2. Supply will automatically
create its own demand. There is also one “subjective assumption”: the utility of real
wage is the sole variable in determining labor supply.
The first objective assumption was obtained from the classical observation
concerning the law of outputs from lands. They noticed that the marginal product of
labor on a given parcel of land will slope downward as the number of laborers
increases. Neoclassical economists did not provide convincing evidence that the same
law would occur in industries other than agriculture. In fact, an increasing or constant
marginal productivity of labor was found in many manufacturing industries,
especially in the long run. However, since agriculture accounted for the majority of
the national product when the classical school dominated the economics study,
thinking of macroeconomic facts with a universal “diminishing marginal productivity
of labor” was a good way to simplify complex problems and make economics more
accessible for them. The theory of a downward sloping labor demand curve was thus
concluded by neoclassical (and classical) economists. Here its principle is clear, with
diminishing marginal productivity of labor, rational producers would only pay the
amount equal to the marginal product of workers in order to achieve profit
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maximization, so the amount of wages that producers are willing to pay decreases
with an increasing amount of labor working on a fixed amount capital.
On the other hand, labor was conceived by Jevons as the “painful exertion of mind
or body undergone partly or wholly with a view to future income”,[2] so the
happiness from consumption achieved by real wages has to be laborers’ primary
motivation for working. Laborers will not produce if the marginal utility of the real
wage falls short of the net pain of working; thus a higher labor price, which implies
more utility from consumption, will motivate more people to work. As a result, an
upward sloping labor supply curve is depicted by neoclassical thinkers, which shows
that the utility of the real wage is the sole variable in determining labor supply. With a
downward sloping labor demand curve and an upward sloping labor supply curve, the
employment level is thus determined by their intersection. In this neoclassical model,
the decision of working or not at the current wage level is completely made by
laborers themselves. If people refuse to work they do it voluntarily, because they
could always find a job for less wages.
The second objective assumption is called Say’s law. Jean-Baptiste Say in his
Treatise of Political Economy said that the only reason that people walk into a
worksite is that they want the income, which can then be used for consumption. Thus
the act of production will simultaneously create income and purchasing power that
contain the same values. J. S. Mill in his Principles of Political Economy expressed
the same idea that
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“What constitutes the means of payment for commodities is simply
commodities, each person’s means of paying for the productions of other
people consist of those which he himself possesses. All sellers are inevitably,
and by the meaning of the word, buyers.”[3] [4]
Classical thinkers further concluded that the newly created purchasing power of
production is entirely applied in two parts: consumption by households and
investments by firms. Since the latter is induced by an increment of consumption in
the future (profit), it can still be considered as delayed consumption. Immediate
consumption and delayed consumption will compete for limited income via interest
rates, as a reward for delaying consumption, whereby constituting equilibrium. In
other words, investment and consumption, via interest rates, will absorb all income. If
people reduce their consumption, the supply of loanable funds increases. As a result,
interest rates will go down and more investment will be induced, and vice versa.
According to this argument, money is neutral and only works as an exchange medium.
The reason is that Say’s law is explained from the perspective of a mean of payment
in real terms, thus no value would be stored in money terms in his system.
Consequently, there will be no impediment to the circulation of real goods.
Furthermore, according to the employment determination in the classical system there
is no impediment to full employment either. Say’s law is so important in the classical
system because it offers no possibility of the general glut. If whatever is produced can
always be absorbed by demand, outputs will only change with changes in marginal
productivity of labor, and the laborers’ willingness to work. It thus justifies the critical
neoclassical conception that unemployment is essentially a voluntary phenomenon.
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Now, the reason why unemployment is not a social problem within the neoclassical
system becomes clear. Unemployment in neoclassical theory is voluntary. People
choose not to work at their will and in fact get better off as a result. However,
involuntary unemployment is indeed a real phenomenon. The answer to this fact from
neoclassical economists was direct and simple. Because the existence of labor unions
raises the negotiation power of labor, if workers work together to irrationally fight any
reductions on the real wage, even though it is much higher than their marginal
productivity, the market is forced to deviate from equilibrium; some people are
involuntary unemployed because other employed people are too “greedy”. If
neoclassical thinking is accurate, involuntary unemployment will be easily solved if
we dismiss labor unions and let market forces work their magic.

Keynes’s criticisms of the neoclassical theory of employment
Neoclassical theory of employment in fact looks quite solid from the perspective of
the model’s construction, seeing that its logic is rather sound on the surface. However,
the world that neoclassical economists depict is not the one people live in. Keynes in
his The General Theory pointed out many mistakes associated with the neoclassical
theory of employment. His criticisms attack two parts: the neoclassical labor supply
theory and Say’s law.
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1. Problems with neoclassical labor supply theory
In the neoclassical theory of employment, the utility of the real wage is the sole
variable in determining labor supply. The logic behind this is simple: since
consumption, as the reward for unpleasant working, is the primary reason that induces
people to work, a higher real wage will always be accompanied with more laborers,
sine higher utility from a higher real wage can compensate for more pains from
working. However, Keynes found that “a situation where labour stipulates for a
money-wage rather than a real wage, so far from being a mere possibility, is the
normal case.” [5] While a reduction of the money wage might confront resistance or
withdrawal of labor due to discontents among workers, a cut in the real wage through
an increase in the price level hardly renders the same result. Besides, Keynes points
out that neoclassical theory suggests that the wage bargaining between entrepreneurs
and workers determine the real wage but wage bargaining, almost always, are made in
nominal terms as opposed to real terms.
To understand Keynes’ criticism, we need to clarify that the strong reactions of
laborers to falling money wages are not due to what is called “money illusion theory”,
which suggests that the illusion of a constant purchasing power of money makes
laborers believe that they can best protect their real wage by resisting a money wage
cut. “Money illusion theory” certainly helps validate neoclassical ideas because it
implies that laborers at heart only care about real wages. In this case, when laborers
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resist money wages, they mean to protect their real wage. But, laborers still behave
contrary to neoclassical doctrine even though they are quite aware of the change of
the price level, saying an increasing price level might reduce their real wage. Hence,
money illusion theory cannot save neoclassical labor supply theory. Without its
support, the practical responses of laborers to changes in both real and money wages
questions the validity of neoclassical labor supply theory. Moreover, if the supply of
labor is not solely a function of the utility of real wages, the entire edifice of
neoclassical employment theory would not hold well.
Neoclassical economists taught us that the existence of involuntary unemployment
is a result of laborers being paid more than their marginal productivity. This suggests
that we can solve the unemployment problem by cutting wages; whether real or
nominal wages, we are left uninformed. According to their labor demand theory, it has
to be the real wage because involuntary unemployment is caused by the fact that
laborers are paid in excess of their marginal productivity. However, it is a rather
difficult to maneuver to execute for the reasons explained below. Therefore, I believe
that neoclassical economists apply a dichotomy to deal with the problem: they imply
cutting the money wage when advising government and mean cutting the real wage
when preaching their doctrines. They reconcile this dichotomy by tacitly assuming
that the difference between the money wage and the real wage would involve no
significant change in their conclusions. But in fact, it does matter quite significantly.
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Keynes was considerably dubious of the neoclassical persuasion whereby they
taught us to believe that
“Prices are governed by marginal prime cost in terms of money and that
money-wage largely governs marginal prime cost. Thus if money-wages
changed, one could have expected the classical school to argue that prices
would change in almost the same proportion, leaving the real wage and the
level of unemployment practically the same as before, any small gain or loss to
labour being at the expense or profit of other elements of marginal cost which
have been left unaltered.”[6]
This statement shows that neoclassical economists’ opinions on dealing with
involuntary unemployment are inconsistent with their value theory. Moreover, if we
ignore the neoclassical value theory and use only Keynes’s idea, we still get the same
conclusion: assuming that a reduction of the money wage will have no effect on price,
a money wage cut will bring more employment only if there is an increase in demand.
However, it oftentimes will only bring a negative effect on aggregate demand because
the direct result of falling money wages is a redistribution of income from laborers to
entrepreneurs. Since Keynes claims that the marginal propensity to consume of
entrepreneurs is lower than that of workers, a falling money wage, with a constant
price level, will deteriorate the demand and thus reduce employment.
The reason why labor resists to a falling money wage is answered by Keynes in this
way: since there is imperfect mobility of labor, it is almost impossible to adjust the
money wage in all industries simultaneously. If workers in some industries accept a
wage cut while others refuse to do so, they will suffer an exclusive relative reduction
in real wages, the effect of which is a redistribution of the aggregate real wage
between different labor-groups instead of improving employment. Thus Keynes
9

thought workers, though unconsciously, “are instinctively more reasonable
economists than the classical school, inasmuch as they resist reductions of
money-wages whereas they do not resist reductions of real wages.”[7]
In addition, Keynes also to some extent denies the neoclassical wage theory as well.
In neoclassical thinking, the real wage is determined by both the marginal
productivity of labor and the marginal disutility of employment. It might be legitimate
to say that laborers would not work if the real wage was not enough to cover the
disutility of working. However, working at a wage level just equal to the marginal
disutility of employment is not what laborers actually do. If people with no
endowment (the working class) refuse to work, they get no means of payment and
isolate themselves from the entire social exchange. From this standpoint, the pain
from working, comparing to the importance of the money wage as means of payment
in social exchanges, is negligible. Therefore, in modern capitalism, laborers are
always working for a real wage above the amount that is only enough to cover the
disutility of work. Keynes, though he didn’t express the same idea when criticizing
the neoclassical theory of wage determination, maintains a similar conclusion by
saying that a reduction in the real wage through an increase in prices will not be
resisted by workers, “unless the reduction proceeds so far as to threaten a reduction of
the real wage below the marginal disutility of the existing volume of employment.” [8]
It certainly implies laborers work for a wage above the amount necessary to cover
their disutility of working and a “not so far” reduction of the real wage is allowed.
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Apparently, according to Keynes, laborers’ resistance to a falling money wage and
their tolerance for a falling real wage indicate problems for the neoclassical labor
supply theory. The utility of the real wage is not the sole variable that determines
labor supply. If the reduction of the real wage via a modest increase in price occurs,
the real wage might not even be the important variable. If Keynes’s explanation from
the perspective of the immobility of laborers is correct, the psychological justice in
distribution might turn out to be another important factor that shapes our labor supply
curve. But unfortunately, it is not further discussed by Keynes.
Also, Keynes thinks that the real wage will fall as employment increases because
the increase in employment is associated with a decrease in labor productivity.
Actually, though, labor productivity normally rises as employment increases, so real
wage cuts do not have to occur with increases in employment. This makes Keynes’s
argument that unemployment is due to insufficient aggregate demand rather than to
high wages even stronger, as Keynes himself recognized in his paper, “Relative
Movements of Real Wages and Output,”[9] in response to papers by John Dunlop and
Lorie Tarshis in the same issues of that journal.

2. The breakdown of Say’s law
Over a century before Keynes’ published his The General Theory, Thomas Malthus
and J. C. Sismondi tried to provide a theoretical rebuttal of Say’s Law. Sismondi
questioned the self-equilibrating nature of a capitalistic system as suggested by Say’s
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Law. He emphasized that while the productive powers of the modern capitalistic
system increase, the
“Working class, having only the purchasing power of subsistence wages, is
unable to purchase all the products the system is capable of producing.
Inadequacy of consumer purchasing power will manifests itself in
overproduction which is the most striking feature of economic crises” [10].
Malthus expressed a similar idea by arguing that
“When profits rise, there will be a tendency for capitalists to spend a smaller
proportion of their gains and to save more. They are more interested in
accumulation than in making large expenditures on consumer goods. Their
savings increase the stock of capital and eventually output, which increases the
problem of maintaining effective demand.”[11]
However, these arguments, though they unveil the mistake that Say might make and
also inspired Keynes’s macroeconomics afterward, did not attract enough attention.
The difficulties of figuring out Say’s problems at that age came from the fact that the
concept of money and the monetary market were underdeveloped. For classical
economists, social exchange does not fundamentally deviate from a barter economy.
As a result, money was only considered as medium of exchange. In addition, they
view interest (a reward for waiting) as the vehicle for equilibrating saving and
investment into equilibrium.
“If goods are intended to be exchanged for other goods; every act of production
simultaneously creates a market for the product produced by market for the
monetary means of purchasing it. An excess supply of all goods relative to the
aggregate demand for them is thus a logical impossibility.”[12]
Keynes’s rebuttals to Say’s law start with a different formulation of interest, which
plays a key role in maintaining Say’s Law. In the classical view, investment is in fact
another form of consumption---consumption in the future. Since future consumption
requires people to abstain from immediate pleasure, interest, as the reward for
12

unpleasant waiting, will automatically adjust the amount of savings to equal to the
amount of investments. This allows current products, regardless what usage they were
put into, to be completely absorbed by demand for either immediate consumption or
investment.
The problem with this theory of determination of interest, as Keynes points out, is
that it completely ignores the real determinant “income” and treats investment and
saving, which are in fact determinates, as determinants. A shift of investment demand
will definitely change income, which further shifts the saving supply curve. So,
without knowing how much saving will be changed by an income shift, there is no
way that the interest rate can be determined in this model. Keynes’s criticisms of
neoclassical ideas on interest are not primarily concerned with the construction of the
model. Rather, it is a more fundamental concern about interest as a reward for waiting.
In Keynes’ opinion, interest in fact is a reward for parting with liquidity, thus it is to a
large extent determined by the public desire for liquidity compared to the quantity of
money in circulation. This standpoint rebuts the neoclassical opinion that money is
neutral because the supply of money under Keynes’s doctrine has substantial power in
affecting the interest rate, which is beyond question an important determinant of the
quantity of investment.
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Alfred Marshall’s “scissors”
The major step Marshall made on the classical system is the incorporation of
marginal utility theory in the determination of value. In the classical model, exchange
value is solely determined by the cost of production, (or, some say, by the
requirements for reproduction) which consists of wages (determined by the value of
laborer’ means of subsistence), normal rate of profits (how it is determined is not
clearly demonstrated by classical economists)，and rents (a result of a uniform price
with differences in fertility of land in the market instead of a determinant of value).
Marshall reasons that assuming a constant marginal utility of money, the larger the
quantity of a commodity a person has, the smaller will be the price that person will
pay for a little more due to the fact that “total utility of a thing to anyone increases
with every increase in the stock of it, but not as fast as his stock increases.”[13].
According to this fact, a downward sloping demand curve is obtained and would be
able to cut the classical upward supply curve, which is based on the law of
diminishing marginal returns, at a price level that just clears the market. This
neoclassical version of value theory in fact made a substantial improvement on Say’s
Law, which completely ignores the importance of the demand side in determining
value. Marshall treats consumers’ wants and their satisfaction as an equally important
element as cost of production in value theory thus concludes that “price is governed
neither by cost of production alone nor by marginal utility alone, but by the
interaction of these forces as they express themselves in the demand for, and the
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supply of, a good”.[14] This is Marshall’s famous “scissors” reference, which
foreshadowed the neoclassical conception of the market mechanism.
This neoclassical value theory, at the time it was created, was a micro model rather
than a macro model. The definition of marginal utility given by Marshall, which set
the neoclassical demand curve, in fact focuses only on the consumption of a single
commodity instead of commodities as a whole. Moreover, the price determined by
this model is the money price, which does not have a clear macro meaning. However,
the central idea of the neoclassical system that the economy is a mechanism for
allocating scarce resources efficiently among competing ends allows this model to
have a macro explanation. Assuming that every single market is in neoclassical
equilibrium, if we add all these individual markets up together, we can obtain the
aggregate supply curve, which shows that at any price level, competition in the factor
market will lead the resource to be allocated in the most efficient manner. Nonetheless,
since the total prime cost (labor, reproducible factors) with fixed production factors
(lands, irreproducible factors) is upward sloping while the amount of aggregate
production increase, we still have an upward sloping aggregate supply curve. On the
other hand, we also get an aggregate demand curve, which shows that at any price
level, the aggregate income will be spent on commodities that generate the most
aggregate utility for consumers. Because consumption of every commodity follows
the universal law of diminishing marginal utility, it follows that aggregate demand
will also follow this principle. As a result, we still obtain a downward sloping demand
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curve. Consequently, the point where the aggregate supply curve cuts the aggregate
demand curve will determine the general price level. This general price is neither the
money price nor the relative price because there is nothing that the general price can
compare with. The general price is in fact the real value of society’s output which is
associated with social welfare. In other words, the general price determined by this
model is the maximized real value of social output that an economy can provide for a
given population facing resource constraints.
Although Marshall improves Say’s law by incorporating the marginal utility theory
in the determination of value, he still adheres to the fundamental idea of Say’s Law –
whatever is produced will be absorbed by demand through the adjustment of market
prices, so the free market can still automatically lead our economy to full employment
and maximum capacity. Once again, in Marshall’s model, no general glut exists and
no unemployment is involuntary. If markets can function perfectly without any
interference, optimal resource allocation will be achieved. The incorporation of the
demand curve fails to distinguish Marshall from classical thought whereby subjecting
his “famous scissor” to Keynes’s critique
The neoclassical conclusion that unemployment is necessarily all voluntary fails to
apply to the involuntary unemployment phenomenon in modern capitalism and as we
have seen, its problems have been pointed out and criticized by Keynes. In the next
chapter, we will see how involuntary unemployment is allowed to occur in Keynes’s
macro model.
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Chapter Two
Keynes’s Theory of Employment

The Effective demand
Keynes’s criticism of neoclassical employment theory shows that problems with
their models cannot be fixed by increasing mathematical rigor so a new way of
thinking about employment is required.
The best way to analyze Keynes’s theory of employment is to begin in an economy
with a random level of aggregate production. This level of production is not
necessarily accompanied with full employment because in Keynes’s opinion “the
effective demand associated with full employment is a special case” and “such an
optimum relationship can only exist by accident or design.” [15] No doubt in this
economy part of production will be consumed, while investments will remain for
purposes of reproduction. The relationship between output after consumption and
desired investment is the pivotal factor in determining the movement of employment.
If the former is absorbed by the latter, current production would be sustainable along
with the employment level. If it falls short of desired investment due to a rise in
marginal efficiency of capital, productions will expand thereby encouraging more
employment. The cap for such production expansion will be the full employment
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level defined by neoclassical thinkers. But there is no reason to conclude that the
market will automatically push the production to this cap. Such expansion can stop at
any point below full employment level associated with a certain level of desired
consumption and desired investment.
The sum of the amount of products which a community is expected to spend on
consumption and the amount which is expected to devote to new investment is called
effective demand, which, in Keynes’s words, determines national output as well as the
employment level. Obviously, this viewpoint counters the neoclassical system
because it allows the economy to run below full capacity with involuntarily employed
workers. If there is a shortage of effective demand and its required level of production
is unable to utilize all the laborers available in the factor market, some people will be
laid off involuntarily. Lower wages will make things even worse because a falling
income for laborers due to a wage cut will render workers more hesitant to spend,
thereby weakening the demand for new investment.

A volatile and pessimistic economy under Keynes’ doctrine
According to Keynes’s arguments, a persistently high level of effective demand
would enable an economy to operate at its maximum capacity, rendering involuntary
unemployment to a minimal, if not nonexistent, level. But after examining the
determination of effective demand, we find out that the tone of Keynes’s doctrine is
one of volatility and pessimism.
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Effective demand consists of desired consumption and desired investment. The
desired consumption (with a certain level of real income) follows a psychological law
that “when aggregate real income is increased aggregate consumption is increased,
but not by so much as income”.[16] It indicates that economic growth is accompanied
with a constant or decreasing marginal propensity to consume, which requires
increasing investments to sustain them. The desired investment is mainly determined
by the marginal efficiency of capital and the interest rate. According to Keynes’
definition, “marginal efficiency of capital is being equal to that rate of discount which
would make the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns expected
from the capital-asset during its life just equal to its supply price”.[17] Since the
marginal efficiency of capital implies the expectation of returns by investors rather
than the objective physical efficiency of capital, it is to some extent a psychological
factor as well. The rate of interest is thought to reflect the general liquidity preference
by a society, which is once again a psychological factor. Since all important factors
that determine general economic performance are psychological phenomenon, free
market at its natural state can hardly ensure a stable effective demand. In an extreme
sense, the employment rate might even become an index of mood.
According to Keynes’s notion of the propensity to consume, economic growth or an
increase in income will extend the gap between consumption and income, maybe even
at an increasing rate. Hence increasing new investments are required in order to
sustain economic growth. That “investors would become even more sanguine about
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further investing while less investment opportunities are left for them to choose due to
decreasing consumption demand” is not at all convincing. Therefore, Keynes’s
attitude to economic growth in fact is pessimistic. Under a free market, wealthier
countries will have a harder time to further improve employment than those poor
ones.

Free market VS government intervention
In the neoclassical system, the market purportedly takes care of “everything”.
People decide whether or not to work and unemployed laborers can always find a job
as long as they overcome their laziness. Throughout competition, scarce natural
resources are used to produce the most needed commodities while consumers
efficiently allocate their incomes. In this prosperous scene, what role is there for the
government? Perhaps a “nightwatchman”, or if market inefficiencies occur, then the
government may seek to restore the competitive, optimal condition that a perfect
market should automatically achieve. At the intersection of the aggregate supply curve
and the aggregate demand curve, optimal conditions are ensured whereby government
intervention only results in less efficient outcomes. A fiscal policy, say a government
purchase, is carried out by sacrificing the consumption of someone else. If the
purchase is financed, the fund is taken away from some other uses. Moreover,
monetary policy will have no effect on economic performance and employment
because money is neutral according to the quantity theory of money. Its consequences
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are mostly realized as a change of the price level and a redistribution of wealth due to
the value change of debts in money terms.
However, in Keynes’s system, things are quite different. Since the nature of the
market is volatile and pessimistic, government’s efforts are required in order to help
economic growth and improve employment. Using Keynes’s models, the government
prerogative is clear. On the one hand, fiscal policy will have direct effects on effective
demand. On the other hand, since the rate of interest is determined by the general
liquidity preference, thus authorities are able to affect interest rates through money
supply and thus adjust desired investments. Keynes’ version of interest shows the
importance and effectiveness of governments’ monetary policy in stimulating the
economy.
Not only so but ever new spending created by government via fiscal or monetary
policy will have a “multiple impact” on aggregate output as long as the full economic
capacity is not achieved. This multiplier effect is based on Keynes’s discovery of the
propensity to consume. Since one man’s spending is some others’ income, a potion of
which will be further spent and become the income of somebody else, an autonomous
increase in spending by governments will generate a sequential series of new demands
through a ripple effect. This multiplied increment of aggregate output, which equals to
/1-C, as a proximate number of

(

is new autonomous

investment triggered by government’s policy and C is the public’s propensity to
consume). Keynes points out that as long as the classical full employment level is not
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achieved,

will bring about

/1-C output as a result. If

is financed by printing

money, the price level will tend to rise but not as much as the amount suggested by
the classical quantity theory of money. Once the full economic capacity is achieved,
anymore

will only proportionally raise the price level and has no effect on output

and employment. Therefore, Keynes’s doctrine completely denies the neoclassical
critique of government intervention. If what Keynes said is true, a wise government
will be capable of maintaining a near full employment level. Large economic
fluctuations due to consumers’ or investors’ mood changes (animal spirits) will also
be minimized due to actions that governments can take to counter them.
Keynes’s effective demand theory of determining economic performance (I think it
was first introduced by Sismondi), provides a framework in which to analyze
macroeconomic problems. His suggestion of government interferences in stimulating
aggregate demand is also proven quite plausible by our past experiences. However,
there is no denying that Keynesians oftentimes feel little helpless while dealing with
major economic crises, not to mention preventing them from happening. Such a
disappointing fact does not mean that Keynes is incorrect, but it did show that his
theory is incomplete. Keynes noticed that involuntary unemployment exists because
effective demand is weak, but he did not really explain why in modern capitalism
there is this weak demand problem. It is my view that the potential for government to
greatly influence effective demand is one that is much exaggerated. This may suggest
much deeper problems inherent in the capitalist economic system. Therefore, it is
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necessary to reexamine the demand problem with economic literature other than
neoclassical ideas. In the next chapter, we will see mistakes that the neoclassical
school made in their consumption theory which allows no possibility of the
under-consumption condition. Then we will also see an alternative theory of
consumption from David Levine, which can be better applied to the current
involuntary unemployment problem.
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Chapter Three
A Study of Consumption Demand

In Keynes’s model, effective demand consists of consumption and investment,
which determine the levels of output and employment. Since their contributions to
economic performance are united, some might ask “if consumption demand is low,
can we always increase investment in order to achieve economic growth? Or, if
investment demand is weak, can we always encourage consumption to obtain the
same result?” The answer is clearly no. Consumption and investment are in fact
correlated, which means that the performance of one factor affects the other. Let’s
consider two extreme cases. If a particular country consumes 99% of its output and
only invests 1%, will this 1% investment be able to provide even half of the
consumption for the next year? Following the same logic, if a country can only
consume 1% of its output and invest 99%, will producers, after seeing the miserable
current consumption, be confident enough to invest even half the amount for the next
year? Therefore, a strong effective demand is definitely not a result of unilateral
contribution but combined efforts of both strong consumption and investment in a
well balanced ratio. Let’s now turn to the analysis of consumption.
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Errors in neoclassical consumption theory
1. Misunderstanding of “wants” in Marshall’s demand curve
Neoclassical consumption theory is constructed on three assumptions associated
with wants and their satisfaction. The first assumption is that human wants are
continuous. This implies that their satisfaction can be achieved via “utility” or
“satisfaction”. In other words, individuals want something not for its particular or
distinctive qualities but the “utility” that it generates. Consequently, there is not a
specific want associated with a specific way of satisfaction. All wants are similar, thus
people can hardy distinguish one from another. The second assumption is that
individuals’ wants are infinite, thus cannot be completely satisfied. Moreover, since
the satisfaction of wants can be achieved by uniform “utilities”, people’s wants for
“utilities” are also infinite. The final assumption is associated with consumption.
Neoclassical thought believes that the consumption of goods (or things) can generate
“utilities”. More importantly, it generates nothing else besides utilities in terms of
consumption. According to this argument all consumption is necessarily the same in
terms of the satisfaction of continuous wants, thus different goods are fungible. It
further consolidates the view that individuals desire “utility” instead of the particular
and distinctive qualities associated with a thing. Since an individual’s want (for utility)
is infinite, but the utility generated from the consumption of goods is finite, scarcity
thus becomes one of the primary concerns of every economy.
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Marshall’s diminishing marginal utility theory is based on these three assumptions.
It determines that as the consumption of a certain commodity increases, the utility
from an additional unit decreases.[18] This theory, as well as the neoclassical
consumption theory, tacitly admits two questionable ideas: 1. People can always
consume multiple units of the same commodity and their wants for every commodity
are infinite; 2. Consumption always takes place in a sequence, and there is enough
time between two consumption points for consumers to realize that marginal utility is
decreasing. The first problem is more fundamental than the second one because if we
deny the idea that “wants” are infinite, we can automatically refute the time interval
that is required to realize the reduction of utility since there is in fact no existence of
utility during the satisfaction of wants.
Marshall asserts that “human wants are countless in number and very various in
kind: but they are generally limited and capable of being satisfied”.[19] This idea
obviously contradicts the neoclassical idea of insatiability of wants upon which
Marshall’s demand curve is based. Marshall vacillates while analyzing the property of
wants and its satisfaction. To some extent it appears that he realized the problem of
“infinite wants” in the neoclassical system, which justifies the diminishing marginal
utility theory. But because diminishing marginal utility is central to his system he fails
to admit its mistakes.
Nevertheless, does diminishing marginal utility theory really describe people’s
consumption behavior? This question is crucial to our argument seeing that
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neoclassical demand theory hinges upon it. Marshall’s confusion implies that
neoclassical demand theory exhibits fundamental problems. Meanwhile, an alternative
opinion on “want and its satisfaction” is provided by Levine, Wilensky and other
contemporary economists.
Alternatively, when people have a “want” (here the word “want” is not the same as
in the neoclassical system), they usually go for a specific commodity or a set of
commodities suitable for satisfaction. If this “want” is properly satisfied, people no
longer demand these commodities under the same purpose unless the same “want”
reemerges in the future. For instance, if a “want” of mine can only be satisfied by
eating four hamburgers, the act of eating three will fail to achieve satisfaction. On the
other hand, eating five hamburgers would be too filling and I would be worse off
rather than satisfied. In addition, suppose there is a large hamburger that equals four
of the regular ones and provides satisfaction after finishing it with no need for the
extra hamburgers. Will I feel the utility from each bite decreasing? And what if my
mouth is big enough to finish it with one bite? Because people are in fact “forced by
social convention and the size of our mouths to eat the food gradually, there is indeed
a process going on which can be seen in marginal terms. But what is also going on is
that we are eating the amount needed to satisfy our appetite.”[20] Not only does our
example imply that the idea of diminishing marginal utility is to some extent
impractical, it also contradicts neoclassical consumption theory. Neoclassical
economists do not believe that “wants” are associated with a specific consumption. In
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their opinion, since all consumption generates “utilities” that satisfy our wants, the
amount of utilities that people can obtain during consumption is of primary concern.
Our consumption habits, on the other hand, are not. Consequently, the above example
of hamburgers cannot be explained by neoclassical ideas for two reasons: 1. Since
wants are infinite and indiscrete, a “want” that can only be satisfied by four
hamburgers does not exist; 2. Since the primary concern is the amount of utility
generated during consumption, “hamburgers” are absolutely an insignificant factor in
our example. It can be freely replaced by anything that is able to generate utility.
Marshall’s confusion propels him to justify his idea of diminishing marginal utility
by demonstrating that commodities have alternative uses. However, the fact is that the
majority of commodities do not have a variety of uses, or not enough to justify a
downward sloping demand curve.
However, since it is true that the demand for a specific commodity increases with a
fall of its price, we thus need an alternative explanation for the downward sloping
demand curve. Here the income, rather than diminishing marginal utility, is the
determinant. Since a capitalist society consists of different classes of income earners,
when the price of a certain commodity falls, individuals of lower income, who
previously could not afford such consumption, are now able to access the commodity.
The increase in demand in this sense has nothing to do with the infinite consumptions
of goods suggested by neoclassical theories. When repetitive purchases happen as a
result of price cuts, the extra amounts are not required by current “wants”, but are
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purchased with the purpose of saving for the similar “wants” in the future. This will to
some extent weaken the future demand of the same commodity. In the long run,
however, extra purchases in different periods will cancel out each other thus no
repetitive purchase will be motivated under the purpose of saving. However in this
case, demand is not as sensitive to a moderate price change, especially in a society
where income discrepancy among different classes is substantial. Hence the
illustration of the relationship between demand and price in a single commodity
model should not be a smooth downward curve, but an unevenly distributed
downward sloping yet jagged wavy line shown as below figure. The mechanics of
such will be addressed in the final chapter.
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2. Hicks’s indifference curve and its relationship with diminishing marginal utility
theory
Hicks, in contrast to Marshall, appears to be more straightforward. But interestingly
enough, Hicks refuses to admit that his indifference curve is based on the same idea as
diminishing marginal utility theory. Hicks in his Value and Capital determined that,
people will show indifference about consuming different combinations of two
particular goods (X and Y). Thus an indifference curve can be depicted to show all
these consumption combinations with the same level of satisfaction. This indifference
curve must slope downward and be convex to the origin. “The reason for convexity is
that the marginal rate of substitution of X for Y, which is the amount of Y the
consumer is willing to give up for an extra unit of X, decreases as more of X is
acquired.”[21] Since there are innumerous indifference curves available in a
two-commodity model, each of which represents a certain satisfaction level, the
maximized satisfaction can be determined by the point where the income constraint
line is tangent to the highest indifference curve. Moreover, a price change of X will
change the slope of the income constraint line thus changing the point of tangency. If
we project every point of tangency between the “income constraint line” and their
respective “highest indifference curve corresponding to different prices of X” into a
quantity and price model, we will also get a downward demand curve for X. This
alternative explanation of a downward demand curve makes Hicks think the
conception of diminishing marginal utility is nonessential to the construction of the
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consumer demand curve. It also avoids concerns with utility by using the concept of
the marginal rate of substitution.
However, Hicks is in fact confused with assumptions that comprise his indifference
model. First of all, “people will feel indifference about a series of different
combination of different commodities” implicitly shows that the consumption of
different commodities will generate a uniform and measurable “satisfaction”, which
allows commodities to be fungible while consumers still feel indifferent. According to
this argument, different wants are not discrete because their satisfactions are
measurable in a uniform manner. Moreover, they are also infinite because the
indifference curve never reaches zero. This is in fact a similar idea to Marshall’s
measurement of utility by using money whose marginal utility is constant. Second, the
convexity of the indifference curve shows that as the consumption of commodity X
increases, its exchange value to commodity Y decreases. If the satisfaction of wants is
uniform and measurable, the only explanation for a convex indifference curve is that
as the consumption of a certain good increases, the satisfaction (utility) it generates
declines in order to justify a convex marginal rate of substitution between two goods.
It is exactly Marshall’s diminishing marginal utility theory! The truth is that “there is
a set of marginal utility curves underlying every set of indifference curves.” [22] This
alterative explanation of the downward sloping demand curve is in fact a complex
version of Marshall’s diminishing marginal utility theory in the sense that its
assumptions implicitly include Marshall’s ideas. The progress Hicks made on

31

Marshall’s theory of demand is that he incorporates income into the discussion which
allows for the analysis of optimum conditions in the consumer sector. This explains
why Hicks is considered the pioneer of welfare economics.
Another important conclusion obtained from Hicks’s indifference model is the
substitution effect. Because people will feel indifferent among bundles that contain
different quantities of the same goods in a two-commodity case, we can get the exact
marginal rate of substitution. However, will people really feel indifferent just by
consuming more substitutes? If not, the entire content of the substitution effect makes
little sense. For example, I have a steak and a bowl of mashed potatoes for dinner and
I have no intent of changing it. Suddenly the price of the potato is doubled. According
to Hicks, I will consume more steak and less potato with indifference. However,
though Hicks is right about people’s reaction to a rising price of potatoes, the reason
for consuming more steak and less potato might not be preserving my “want” for that
particular meal. My “want” for dinner would never be fulfilled by consuming more
substitutes because it requires a specific amount of steak and mashed potatoes.
However, the consequence that some income is freed to satisfy other “wants” makes
the deal acceptable.
Our entire debate on Hicks’ indifference model focuses on whether or not there is a
feeling of “indifference” during the satisfaction of wants. If we obey the neoclassical
ideas of infinite wants and utility theory, “indifference” would be justified. However,
if the fundamental idea of “wants” is misunderstood and different “wants” are discrete
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and finite, the entire indifference model would collapse. This occurs because its
prerequisite – the feeling of “indifference” among different levels of consumption
which is based on utility theory – would not exist. My arguments have shown the
difficulties of analyzing people’s consumption behavior via the neoclassical
formulation of wants. Moreover, the existence of involuntary unemployment in
modern capitalism indicates the ineffectiveness of the price system under the free
market in adjusting the economy. If “want” and its satisfaction are indeed
misunderstood by neoclassical economists, an alternative explanation is in need. We
shall now reexamine the idea of “wants” and its concomitant explanation as “needs”.

Needs and their new meanings
Neoclassical economists use the term “wants” to define peoples’ general
motivations for personal consumption. It can also be understood as the reason why
people enter into a relationship between individuals and means of consumption for
their own sake. The idea of “wants” is absent of the force of necessity and this
absence “expresses itself most clearly when neoclassical economists argue that the
decisive aspect of consumption is choice among ends.”[23] Thus a person chooses
one commodity over another not because he needs it but rather because he prefers it.
It makes wants entirely arbitrary.
Neoclassical economists believe that wants and means to satisfy wants are
independent of each other. On the one hand, wants are insatiable in a very strong
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sense – people have infinite wants in regard to consumption at any moment. One can
assert that individuals are never completely satisfied. On the other hand, the resources
available to satisfy wants are fixed by nature and their quantity is also independent of
wants. As a result, not only are people’s wants circumscribed by natural resources, but
also, the primary goal of any economy is to deal with scarcity: to allocate limited
resource (as efficiently as possible) among competing ends in order to achieve the
highest satisfaction level.
However, if the neoclassical idea of “wants” is right, then the market functions
perfectly and will achieve utility maximization. Moreover, there is no reason for the
situation of under-consumption to occur because consumption demand associated
with “infinite wants” should also be infinite. The demand problem associated with
developed capitalism indicates the need to reformulate the conception of “wants”;
David Levine has an insight on this problem in his book Needs, Rights, and the
Market. Here I will borrow his ideas of “need” and show how the change of notion
from “wants” to “needs” helps us elucidate upon the inefficiencies of demand within a
capitalist economy.

1. Subsistence needs in classical doctrine
Generally speaking, the idea of “needs” implies the force of necessity or a
requirement of life. The dependency of fish upon water serves as an apt metaphor. In
fact, the idea of “needs” takes us back to the origins of economics. Classical
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economists use the term “subsistence” to describe the minimum requirements that
suffice needs in terms of the human being as a biological organism, thus allowing
laborers to routinely participate in the production of “net products” (luxury or riches).
The problem with this classical idea is that it treats laborers as “produced inputs”
instead of humans. At least from the perspective of consumption, there is absolutely
no personality involved in laborers’ consumption pattern. Every single laborer is
assumed by classical thinkers to live on a rather similar basket of subsistence goods.
Though classical economists did not clearly describe the constituents of this
subsistence basket, one thing for sure is that this consumption basket does not allow
for the cultivation of personality or distinctive modes of life. This idea denies the
meaning of the market for laborers because the nature of the market allows its
participants to find their means of consumption by and for themselves. The specific
“subsistence basket” is predetermined for laborers and makes the existence of the
market completely meaningless. This contradiction goes to the very core of the
classical idea of subsistence needs.
However, the classical idea of needs is not necessarily incorrect. Its problem comes
from specific limitations. Subsistence needs are indeed needs, but there are others as
well. When our discussion of needs occurs in developed capitalism, subsistence needs
are essentially dependent with other needs, which we can hardly separate from each
other. In this situation, the idea of need presents a lot more contents than the classical
school offers. Now the question is left as to how we should define those “other needs”.
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How do they become the force of necessity without thinking they are requirements for
a primitive human life?

2. Individually determined needs
When we say someone is different from another, we often refer to features of
personality rather than biological makeup. According to Levine, personality has
integrity, which means that the individual has his attitudes to the world and the
realization of himself which he wants to preserve through time. “The concept of
integrity refers to the internal coherence of the personality. It motivates or forces the
person into a certain mode of life. The concept of mode of life refers to a set of
actions and external relations through which the specific structure of the individual’s
personality expresses and realizes itself.”[24] According to these definitions, if people
lose the integrity of their being as unique individuals, not only would the internal
coherence of their personality be damaged, but the external relations with the world
would collapse, the result of which is the loss of social meaning. Based on this idea
we can obtain a new meaning of needs with a general applicability: needs are the
requirements for maintaining the integrity of our being as unique individuals. Its force
of necessity is shown as serious damage to our integrity both internally and externally
if our needs fail to be satisfied.
This idea of needs is also followed by three important conclusions associated with
the demand problem. First, individual’s needs are correlated with each other and each
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particular need contributes to a structure of needs that define our mode of life. Hence
at a normal condition, the independent subsistence need as defined by classical
thinkers does not exist. For example, when I have a need for dinner, I barely think
what kind of foods can provide the nutrients that keep my body running. It should
have my comfort flavor, dismiss my feeling of hunger, contain no meat since I am
vegetarian, and the ambience is also important – I would rather refuse to eat my
dinner if I cannot eat a meal at home with my parents. These needs are associated with
the general structure of my needs for dinner. If only part of these needs is fulfilled, it
would not be a dinner specified for my satisfaction. Levine’s idea of needs is
essentially different from the classical ideas that consider needs only at a subsistence
level. Second, needs are not infinite and definitely satiable. In addition, each
(individual) consumption decision is not based upon a random whim or preference.
Rather, it is part of a coherent way of life that sustains the integrity of the individual’s
personality. The integrity of our personalities does not require unlimited goods. We
have a definite sense of self with a definite personality, supported by a definite way of
life. Therefore it only requires specific means of consumption that can satisfy our
specific needs, which sustain our integrity. It certainly contrasts with neoclassical
consumption theory since “unlimited wants” in the neoclassical sense (insatiability)
are formless, and are never for particular things, just for more. A being with unlimited
wants would have no personality as a result. Although our needs will change and
expand with the development of our personality, the expansion of our needs as a result
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of personality development will finally cease at death rendering our needs finite in the
ultimate sense. Finally, since needs are satiable and their satisfaction depends on how
our life mode can be constructed by available products, we can easily abandon the
neoclassical standpoint of scarcity in satisfying wants and ground our analysis on the
standpoint of wealth, which assumes that the scale of social production of useful
property can grow with the expansion of needs. If the amount of wealth depends on
social production that is not entirely resource constrained, production has the power to
determine whether or not individual needs can be satisfied. Thus unsatisfied needs can
always be fulfilled by improving production.
In order to distinguish Levine’s idea of needs from classical thinking, I use the term
“individually determined need” to describe needs beyond subsistence. However, as I
have said, needs are correlated with each other so when it comes to their satisfaction,
we absolutely cannot isolate the satisfaction of subsistence needs from individually
determined needs.

3. The development of personality and the satisfaction of needs
When people have needs that cannot be satisfied in and of themselves, they will
enter the market place for purposes of consumption. The existence of the market is
basically manifested in two aspects: 1.The market is capable of providing
consumption good that individuals themselves cannot produce. Otherwise, why bother?
2. Individuals have the freedom to choose the means of consumptions they need for
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and by themselves. If the means of consumptions are predetermined, then it is known
as rationing instead of using the market.
Generally speaking, there are three options people have in the market when they
have unsatisfied needs. First, they can get the same basket of commodities all the time,
the consumptions of which will help them maintain their existing modes of life
completely. Second, they can look for something new to fit in their current mode of
life with a good will that their personalities can be better expressed. Finally, they can
aggressively try commodities inconsistent with their current life mode with the
willingness to deny part of their personalities, and then define themselves with a “new
life”.
The first situation will occur to a small subset after their structure of life mode has
been well developed. This occurs because sticking to a basket of commodities
requires that personalities absolutely cease to develop and so does the life mode
constructed upon them. To most people, such a situation is not sustainable. The
development of personality proceeds with the expansion of our knowledge about the
objective world and ourselves. While the former is unavoidably learned during our
daily contacts with everything, the latter expands and changes with the former. Unless
people intentionally refrain from contact with the outside world, there is no way for
the personality to completely cease to develop. The development of personality will
directly result in changes of our life modes, which require new consumption
experiences to better fit them. Hence our enthusiasm in regard to experiencing new
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things never fades away. If new consumption bundles are available in the market,
there is always a tendency for the demand temporarily or permanently to switch from
old ones. If new consumption is not available, there are always requirements for new
consumption to come out. Meanwhile, the demand of old consumption would decline
because needs associated with old life modes will be gradually replaced by needs
associated with new life modes, which is more consistent with the development of our
personality.
The second situation is consistent with these arguments about the development of
personality. But the problem is that when we have needs that the current consumption
basket cannot fulfill, we always feel indecisive when we choose new commodities,
which makes our decision looks arbitrary. Does it necessarily mean that we need to
lend support to the ideas of choice and preference? The answer is no. Levine thinks
indecision can arise for two reasons: First, “the outcome may not matter to us.” In this
case, consumption doesn’t fulfill any needs. We are in fact not indecisive because our
decisions have no basis. Second, “the outcome may be a matter of considerable
importance and affect us deeply, but we may not know exactly how it will affect us.
We may have real and important needs, but we may not know them.” [25] If we do not
know something that exists objectively, we might be able to find out the answer by
seeking help from others. However, if what we do not know only exist subjectively,
our problem cannot be solved by making an arbitrary choice based on preference.
Rather we must find it out on our own. Levine aptly points out that “much of life
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consists of the effort the individual devotes to finding out how he wants to lead his
life and therefore what he really needs.”[26] As a result, “consumption in fact is a
learning process. When we consume a good, we engage in a social practice. By so
doing, we understand the nature of our needs better than we did when they only
existed as an ideal.”[27] During this process, mistakes are unavoidable, but it does not
by any means show that people are making arbitrary decisions from their preferences.
People are indeed looking for the right consumption bundles to fit their needs, but
they often lack the knowledge about specific outcomes that can incur unexpected
results.
The propensity for people to discard part of their personality and fundamentally
change their current life mode rarely occurs. There are two reasons for such a
phenomenon: 1. There is much more to the objective part of personality than just that
what people happen to want to do requires other people. According to Levine, unless
people can objectify their sense of self in the way that is acknowledged by other
individuals, they will not be able to sustain the integrity of their personality; 2. Even if
this prerequisite is satisfied, links between individuals and the society will result in
tremendous costs.
People’s sense of self provides guidance for how they live their lives. However, the
reality of such a life depends on their social meanings (not brain functions). With no
interaction with the objective world, needs have little meaning to life. We refer to a
certain life mode in the way our thoughts are actualized and achieved by our society.

41

For instance, my mode of life as a keyboard player in a band can only be achieved if
there are musicians who I can play with and an audience who appreciates our music.
Without these people, not to mention those instruments, the mode of life I desire as a
member of a band can only exist as a projection. Therefore, the establishment of a life
mode essentially implies our whole connection with the world. We cannot objectify
our sense of self without following a way that is acknowledged by our society. Even if
we objectify it with its acknowledgment, we might still destroy the existing bonds that
often take an inordinate amount of time to reconnect. For example, what if I intend to
abandon my life as a music lover and live like a warrior? This idea has to be
acknowledged by other individuals in order to sustain the integrity of my personality
as a warrior. Nevertheless, I would still lose the connections with people and things
that came into my life because of music. In addition, it takes substantial time and
effort to reconnect myself with the warrior. From the perspective of social meaning,
people normally will not discard their personality and life mode unless they have no
alternatives.
The transformation of life style associated with a change of personality will
fundamentally change individuals’ needs and their consumption patterns. They stop
purchasing commodities formally possessed in abundance and seek goods that
embody their new lifestyle. But, since they are unfamiliar with the new world they
need to connect with it is very likely that they will explore new terrains in which
mistakes may be made.
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Levine’s idea of “needs” allows the condition of under-consumption to occur. Since
needs are finite, (if they are properly satisfied) they can be reduced to the point where
demand is rendered moot. Thus the general glut in developed capitalism does not
satisfy the conditions of wealth as defined by Levine. This is so because if
commodities in the market cannot develop with the development of personality, the
new means by which to construct a life mode required by developed personality is
unobtainable. Some of our needs will remain unsatisfied and we will feel the damage
to our integrity, even as some other products remain abundant. Moreover, even if the
condition of wealth can be achieved, which means our productions are potentially
able to satisfy every need that our society requires, the distribution problem will ruin
it. “A sharply unequal distribution can create scarcity by stimulating the need of those
at both ends of the scale. Poverty, then, is not simply the absence of wealth; it is the
absence of wealth in the presence of wealth.”[28] Unfortunately, the current demand
problem in developed capitalism attributes to both of these problems.
Keynes in his The General Theory focuses on stimulating investments to counter
economic downturns, which to some extent shifts our attention away from problems
associated with consumption. However, a necessary argument about the relationship
between consumption demand and investment demand is not provided by Keynes and
consequently, by solely stimulating investment, the increment of aggregate effective
demand is proven by history short-lived and unsustainable. So, there are three
important things we need to know about the production side of modern capitalism:
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1.The relationship between consumption demand and investment demand; 2.the
production structure and the production purpose of modern capitalism; 3.The power
of modern capitalist producers.
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Chapter Four
Investment and production
The incentive to invest
When an individual decides to buy capital-assets and hire laborers to produce
commodities, regardless of the usage of these commodities, we note this term as
investment. By undertaking such a task his immediate consumption is sacrificed (This
is a neoclassical idea. For Keynes, what is sacrificed is the liquidity of his
capital-assets), whereby compensated with a particular return. Profits are thought to
be the primary motive for every investment in a capitalist society. In the modern
economy, profit is not an increment of real goods, but an increment of money. This
should be exempt from price changes so its value is able to be maintained. Using
Keynes’s idea of money, profit is therefore the increment of wealth with perfect
liquidity. With perfect liquidity, there is no constraint on the usage of profits. They can
be consumed, reinvested, or even remain idle.
In the classical system, the rate of profit is thought to be historically determined.
According to Ricardo’s model, rent is not considered as a cost of production but a
result of uniform price with differences in fertility of land in the market. Its average
rate equals to the average productivity of employment minus its marginal productivity.
The employment level is determined by real wage, which should equal to the cost of
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subsistence. The rate of profit therefore equals to the marginal productivity of
employment minus the average subsistence cost. We notice that the only two
“determinants” (in terms of mathematics, but with no economic meanings) of profit in
Ricardo’s model – the productivity of labor and the subsistence cost – are unlikely to
vary in short term. Hence the rate of profit is considered predetermined by the market
for a specific long period. Adam Smith believed that “profit would be in the
neighborhood of approximately double the rate of interest on a well-secured loan”,[29]
but he didn’t provide any evidences to show how this rate is obtained. In fact, no
economic explanation for the determination of profit is given by classical economists.
In the neoclassical system, profits only exist in the condition of imperfect competition.
Perfect competition would compete away any profits and make the return to capital
equal to the rate of interest as the reward for unpleasant waiting. However, some
neoclassical economists argue that perfect competition allows for the existence of
profits as the compensation for investment risks. Moreover, this rate is thought to
some extent to be historically determined as well.
A predetermined rate of returns (either regarded as profits or interest) allows
producers to enter the market with certain investment returns, thereby decreasing
levels of uncertainty. However, since the classical theory is based on a non-existing
“omnipotent market” where the failure of effective demand never occurs, Keynes’
definition concerning investment incentives proves to be the most apt. Since the
market predetermined rate of profit is nonexistent, investors may refer to past
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statistics for a generalized idea of the profit rate but this number does not guarantee
any investment return in the future. As a result, the “expected” rate of profit, instead
of the “predetermined” rate of profit, becomes the driving force for every new
investment. Keynes uses “marginal efficiency of capital” to express the same idea.
According to his explanations, the quantity of new investment is to a large extent
psychologically determined in the short run. If all investors are simultaneously
implanted with the idea that “the economy is on its way to prospering” by “Cobb”
(the guy from “Inception”), in reality, we will have a temporary economic prosperity
due to a strong investment demand. Whether or not new investments can be sustained
depends on the profits materialized by the corresponding effective demand. Even
though Keynes agreed that most people are rational and oftentimes react properly on
existing experiences, he tended to place more emphasis on the power of “animal
spirits”. This is one of the central ideas of Keynes’ prescription for instances of
government regulation.
Moreover, the interest rate, as given in a new explanation by Keynes, still plays an
important role in motivating new investments. For investors whose starting funds are
financed, interest becomes the cost of finance that they take into account before
investing. On the other hand, for investors who own endowments, interest is their
opportunity cost of carrying out investing activities. In sum, Keynes’s believes there
are two primary factors that directly affect the incentive to invest: the marginal
efficiency of capital (or the expected rate of profit) and the rate of interest.
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The effect of consumption demand on investment
The effect of demand on investment (or production) might be the most pivotal
argument because it is essentially required in order to make the necessary transition
from the neoclassical thinking into Keynes’ world, and thereby understanding the
weakness associated with capitalism.
Neoclassical economists believe that the price system in the market will
automatically reconcile all the demands and supplies into equilibrium so the failure of
effective demand is impossible, especially in the long run. However, the price model
constructed by Marshall as well as other neoclassical thinkers is based on an
erroneous understanding of “want and its satisfaction”. If individual want is finite and
able to be satisfied, and different wants are discrete with each other, the price system
would not function as well as neoclassical economists expect and the effective
demand may be inadequate. This is also one of the central ideas of Keynes’s The
General Theory although he does not offer an explicit definition and understanding of
“needs”. Keynes determines that new investment is motivated primarily by the
marginal efficiency of capital (or expected profit rate). Investors, before they take any
actions, will calculate the present value of a series of annuities given by the returns
expected from the capital-asset during its life time. As long as the expected present
value is not below the supply price of capital-assets, new investment will be
stimulated.
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Since the series of yields from capital-assets usually cover a long time span,
making predictions about them is quite difficult. Consequently, rational investors
would prefer that their predictions are made on a solid basis instead of a “guess”. A
primary basis of prediction is analyzing demand of their previous products or similar
products in the market. These particular demands materialize the actual profits from
previous investments. If such demands are strong, investors will be confident with the
profitability in new investments; if such demands are weak, investors will prefer to
keep the liquidity of their assets. When we apply this idea to the whole economy, we
will see that the aggregate level of new investments, to a large extent, depend on the
current economic environment. A thriving economic environment characterized by
strong effective demand will encourage new investments. But a depressive economic
environment characterized with weak demand will discourage investments, thus
making things worse. This, in Keynes’ opinion, is the reason for business cycles.
Before we go any further, it is necessary to clear up the possible confusion about
consumption demand and investment demand. As we know, the demand for new
products can either be for consumption purposes or production purposes in mind:
while some products are used for consumption, others become the means of
production for other products. It is quite true that as the complexity of production
increases, more and more producers are specialized in the production of factors,
which might further be used in producing another factor. An obvious question reveals
itself: can investment demand (demand of production factors) alone generate profits
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to sustain the reproduction process and also the accumulation of capital? In other
words, can investors make profit solely from the production of factors and completely
overlooking consumption goods? If the answer is yes, Capitalism should never
experience an effective demand problem. But unfortunately, this is similar to the idea
of a perpetual-motion machine, which is impossible to achieve in reality.
Let’s first consider profits in real term. In classical thinking, the effects of demand
on production are completely ignored. As long as investments can generate an
increment of real products, the positive answer to this question can be justified.
However, unlimited production capacity of factors is not realistic. If the fertility of
lands can be reproduced by absorbing the energy from the sun, when the sun is burnt
out, earth is done unless we find another source of energy. However, there is little
need to discuss whether or not the productivity of production factors is finite because
the increment of “real goods” is not at all meaningful in our discussion. Since profit is
set in money terms instead of real terms, an increment of real goods might not
generate any profits if their price falls substantially. Money price, on the other hand,
is not determined by production alone but by the interaction of both demand and
supply. Without referring to the demand side, no price level can be determined. If we
say that there are consumption demands because needs associated with consumption
are required to be satisfied, why then is there investment demand, or demand of
production factors? Because people can use these factors to produce other products
which can be sold at a profit. But why then is there demand of those “other products”?
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Because they once again can be used for satisfying needs associated with
consumption or producing further products which can be sold for profits. We notice
that as long as consumption goods are not yet made production steps into a circle –
production factor to another production factor. However, no matter how long this
repeating production process continues, it will finally end up with consumption goods.
Producers cannot make production factors and profits indefinitely. Without use value,
exchange value (price) would not exist and a commodity can no longer be called a
commodity. Production factors have no direct use value, but a price is attached
because they are used to produce something that has direct use value. In other words,
no production factors will ever be produced if they contribute nothing to consumption
goods, which have direct use value to consumers. For instance, if “screws” cannot be
used to produce anything, or can only be used to produce garbage, can “screws” be
called commodities and be able to demand a price? As a conclusion, investment
demands alone cannot sustain the reproduction process in capitalism because every
investment must be realized by consumption demand in the market. Hence the
consumption demand is the essential part of aggregate demand and also the primary
driving force of the economy.[30]
Now let’s turn to the effect of demand on investment via the interest rate. A high
interest rate, no matter as a cost of production or opportunity cost, will reduce profit,
thereby discouraging new investments. A lower interest rate, on the other hand, will
encourage new investment. Assuming that the quantity of money is fixed, as well as
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the liquidity preference of the society, all the money available in the market will
adhere to the following motives: transaction, precaution, or speculation. If aggregate
demand is weak, less money will be held for transaction and precautionary motives
thus enhancing the importance of the speculative motive. As a result, the interest rate
has to fall sufficiently in order to “exceed the expectation of some “bull” and so
influence him to sell his bond for cash and join the “bear” brigade.”[31] In this
situation, a rise of demand will have a negative effect on new investment through a
rise of the interest rate. However, such an effect is often considered subordinate for
the following reasons: 1. people’s liquidity preference normally changes with a
change of their demands. Thus a movement of interest rates as a result of a demand
change is always ambiguous; 2. It is discovered that when the interest rate falls below
a certain point, the demand of money might become perfectly elastic with the interest
rate. Thus, the interest rate loses its power in stimulating investment. It is well known
as the “liquidity trap”; 3. When people decide to invest, they oftentimes are quite
confident with the business outcome. Their perspective rates of profit therefore are
normally much higher than the current rate of interest. It just makes little sense that
investors would take action at an expected breakeven point, so a moderate change of
interest has limited effects on new investments. Also, the ratio of debt to total capital
may be more important than the interest rate.
As we can see, because consumption determines investment, and effective demand
– the sum of consumption demand and investment demand – determines the rate of
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employment and aggregate output, so the core issue in the involuntary unemployment
problem now centers upon the failure of consumption demand. As we have seen, such
phenomena can hardly be cured by adjusting the price and the interest rate.

Corporate industry and mass production in modern capitalism
Corporate industry is characterized by mass production, which is based on
large-scale machines, technology and advanced management techniques. Machinery
and equipment become important in the production process and accounts for a
substantial part of production costs.[32] The advantage of corporate industry,
comparing to a craft economy, is that production is much more efficient in making
mass goods thereby reducing production costs. Moreover, it provides the necessary
capital pool for innovation especially for capital-intensive and high-tech products.
Things impossible to produce in a pre-industrial system now come true.
In a craft economy, workers are the family members, or hired hands and very often
apprentices, who live with the family.”[33] They are bound to their firms by personal
loyalty and emotional ties. Every laborer is also specialized in their specific
production process thus employers are hard pressed to find a replacement if their
workers are laid off. However, corporate industry changes the role workers play in the
production process. Since the production process is broken down by advanced
management techniques, generalized skill sets are a prerequisite over those of a highly
specialized nature. Consequently, the same job can be equally performed by different
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groups of workers. Workers laid off in one industry can apply their skills in many
others so there is no lack of replacements for absent workers. In corporate industry,
the opportunity cost of firing a worker is quite low. Employers will not hesitate to do
so if they think necessary. In addition, advanced technology and management
technique allows flexible outputs and employment on the basis of fixed product
designs in mass production. That is to say, by adjusting the pace of work determined
by machinery, different amounts of products with the same quality can be produced at
a nearly constant marginal cost.[34] Therefore, labor costs in corporate industry are
no longer fixed costs. They now emerge as variable costs.
While employment and output are flexible in modern capitalist production, price
remains inelastic to demand change. One reason for price rigidity is that technology
makes storage of goods possible and affordable. If products cannot be sold
immediately due to weak demand, producers store them and wait for demand to be
restored. Nevertheless, demand rises with a falling price and so it still makes sense for
producers to reduce the price of their products when demand is weak in order to rid
themselves of their inventory and clear the way for new products instead of paying
storage costs waiting for demand to pick up. But the reality of corporate industrial
organization provides a different description. We already know that mass production
requires a large amount of investment in capital-assets, which include land, buildings,
and equipments. Such capital costs are of course fixed, and must be paid back
gradually from the sale of products during their life time. With the modern banking

54

system, “current cost” is always amortized and spread out over a number of years. As
a result, investors will carefully set their price with a long run consideration and make
sure that the total revenue is enough to cover total fixed and variable cost. Keeping
the long run consideration in mind, corporate industrial producers will negotiate
relative long-term contracts with both their factor suppliers and retailers. They do not
want their business plan disturbed by unexpected changes in the business environment.
In this situation, reduction of prices will be dangerous for two reasons: First,
consumers will accept a price cut at any time for obvious reasons. If prices were to
increase though, they might express discontent by reducing current consumption or
even switching to competitive producers. In addition, if consumers know that prices
fluctuate, they are likely to withdraw their spending when prices are high and wait
until they decrease. From this perspective a price cut by producers should be
permanent, which can only be achieved by an improvement in efficiency instead of an
adjustment to demand. A temporary price cut might help stimulate short run demand,
but will harm long run revenues. Moreover, changing prices requires renegotiating
contracts, which generates extra work and costs.[35][36] This might be the reason
why modern producers would rather distribute coupons and promote sales events as
responses to weak demand instead of prices. They want customers to know that price
cuts are only a special case whereby preserving price expectations. Second, price cuts
are carried out with the hope of selling more units, which will only occur if
competitors do not follow suit. If their competitors follow (without an expansion of
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the market or a rise in incomes) no producers will gain.[37] Therefore, cutting price is
quite unfavorable in mass production. “Faced with a drop in demand, it is far better to
sit tight, reduce output and variable costs by laying off workers, and wait for sales to
pick up.”[38]
In corporate industry, employment and output is flexible, but price is rigid.
Employment and output, instead of price, will be adjusted to aggregate demand. It is
exactly what Keynes’ main argument is in The General Theory.

Supply creates demand in a modern sense
Say’s law was of direct concern to Keynes’ analysis. The explanation by Say and J.
S. Mill (from the perspective of “real means of payment”) is not persuasive, but they
still achieve a valid conclusion. Supply indeed is capable of creating new demand,
especially when that demand is realized as “individually determined needs”.
Satisfaction of needs requires two side efforts. Consumers need to realize the
existence of their needs and discover them on their own accord. Producers need to
produce commodities whose consumption is able to satisfy specific needs. Since
people sometimes do not know their own needs or how consumption satisfies them,
producers are able to introduce new products that fit into the life mode required by
unsatisfied needs. New demand, as a result, will be created. Such creations are not
thought to be done by the side of consumers because they are unclear about their
needs or the means to satisfy them. New demands are in fact motivated by producers,
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who create new “principles” for a better life which stimulate new demands. Without
producers’ efforts, whatever consumers need might still remain covered or only exists
as a vague projection.
For example, before the iPad was introduced, very few consumers had an image of
something that functions and looks exactly like an iPad. However, after the iPad was
introduced to consumers, they suddenly realized that the life mode this device can
provide is suitable to their needs. As a result, using an iPad makes consumers feel
better off since their unsatisfied or even unrealized needs are now satisfied. In this
case, it is not just to say that the iPad market is created by a sudden increase in
general demand. In fact, “Apple” created this new market thereby fostering additional
demand.
The producers’ potential for demand creation is actually stronger than what the iPad
example offers. In the market, consumers have the right and freedom to choose the
commodities they want within their income constraints. But the market has no
obligation to perfectly fulfill every need. According to Levine’s basic claim, the
market should produce commodities just for the market itself, not for particular
individuals. But these commodities should be such that individuals can make them
their own, incorporating them in their own, unique ways of life. Therefore,
commodities in the markets, in most case, are pre-constructed. There is no guarantee
that every need can be fulfilled by the commodities available. If a certain need is left
out, there is little consumers can do. This is especially true in modern industry where
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exchange is characterized as “impersonal”[39] – every purchase contributes very little
to the exchange outcome for capitalist producers. Consequently, capitalist producers
have no reason to customize their products for every single consumer because their
motive of production is profit rather than the happiness of consumers and social
welfare. They aim at a specific consumer class targeted by their production plans at
the beginning, and try to sell as many products as possible later. If producers cannot
always be as good as “Apple”, they have to rely on advertisements which are
potentially capable of leading consumers’ behaviors. Meanwhile, as many consumers
are unaware of their needs they become susceptible to select advertisements. As a
result, in the process of need satisfaction, producers to some extent have the power to
guide consumers’ demand patterns and even decide the mode of life for them.
Consumers (though they have the right to choose freely in the market) are limited by
the provision of choices. With pre-constructed commodities and elaborately designed
advertisements, people unconsciously live in a life designed by capitalist producers.
Consumers are free only in terms of free choice making on available commodities, but
considering their choices are per-constructed raises concerns about their freedom.
Notice here the idea that producers’ power to create demand does not conflict with
our previous conclusion that “individuals have to find out their needs on their own.
Although the principle of a better life (which remains unknown to individuals) is
created by producers, individuals are not forced to incorporate them into their life
mode. They adopt them because they believe this principle is coherent with their
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personality. As a result, their lives will be better off by incorporating those products,
which happen to be what they really need. As long as people still believe their needs
are properly satisfied, their integrity remains undamaged. It might be hard to fathom
that our feeling of satisfaction and the condition of wealth to some extent relies on our
beliefs. A very simple example will prove this idea. I think all faithful disciples of any
cult believe what they are doing is what they need. They actually feel happy and
satisfied in their life mode even if the pursuit of that “distorted faith” requires them to
sacrifice their lives or even hurt others. So for a capitalist producer, creating and
cultivating consumers’ beliefs might be more important than what to produce since
from the perspective of producers, the former is an active controllable task, but the
latter is a passive task that contains more uncertainty.
The capitalistic production structure to some extent reflects the ideology of
capitalism. The ideology of capitalism on the other hand shapes the demand pattern of
capitalist class who own the majority of the national income. In the next chapter, we
will see how the capitalistic production and demand pattern, both of which are
determined by the ideology of capitalism, contradict with each other and thus beget
the inherent weakness of capitalism – under consumption.
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Chapter Five
Problems with the Superiority of the Modern Capitalist System in
terms of Effective Demand

The distribution problem in Capitalism
The economic world we live in is not perfect, and it might never be. Neoclassical
thinkers hold utopian view of the perfectly functioning market place. Unfortunately,
the market is not as omnipotent as they thought, and not surprisingly, economies
under neoclassical doctrine were not immune to economic fluctuations. The
emergence of Keynesianism changed the way that people thought of the economic
world: Effective demand as a primary driving force for a better economy was unveiled.
In addition, the failure of the market in reconciling demand to supply as well as the
power of “animal spirits” in affecting economic performance were realized.
Government intervention is thus advocated by Keynesians to counteract economic
downturns, but once again, the power of governments is overstated. The government
is able to use monetary and fiscal policy as a means to temporarily mitigate economic
crises, but their effects are often short-lived and ineffective. Such limitations of
government actions require further reflection upon the capitalist system. It is possible
that some of the problems associated with effective demand in a capitalist society are
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not because people get lost in an abnormal condition. Instead, they are caused by the
“inherent weakness” of the capitalistic system. To explore these “inherent weaknesses”
of capitalism is the concern of this section.

1. Unevenly distributed wealth
Marx is the pioneer economist to criticize the injustice of distribution of wealth in
capitalism with systematic arguments. He believes that the primary goal of capitalism
is to assure a certain long-run rate of accumulation. Real wages, in addition to the
employment rate, are adjusted freely so as to make the rate of capital accumulation
possible. Since Marx did not manage to detach himself completely from classical
thinking his analyses focus on the cost of production. According to Marx, since all the
net products are distributed between capitalists and laborers, the real wage has to be
depressed to the point whereby guaranteeing a given tread rate of capital growth.
However, it does not necessarily mean that the real wage is unable to rise. Marx
argues that since the real wage is a function of the degree of unemployment – the ratio
of unemployed to employed people – in the long run, a rise in the real wage can be
achieved by a decline of relative unemployment. Marx justifies this idea by saying:
“In a developing capitalist system, the rate of accumulation can easily exceed
the growth of population, because the very process of accumulation will lead to
dispossession of small proprietors and bring new recruits into the army of
industrial workers.”[40]
In addition, he thought technological progress could help relative employment
growth.

61

“Marx shows again that the process of technological improvement is itself
influenced by the pace of accumulation of capital: if this exceeds the growth of
the labour force, and relative unemployment therefore declines, a tendency for
real wages to rise will set in”.[41]
However, to argue whether or not the real wage can rise in capitalism is not Marx’s
intention. What he really wants to say is that real wages can never rise
proportionately to the increase in the productivity of labor. In other words, laborers
are exploited by capitalists during production and as the capital accumulation
increases, the rate of exploitation follows along with income discrepancy. As a result,
“Even though the consumption of the worker has risen, the social satisfaction
which it grants has diminished in comparison with the greater enjoyments of
the capitalist in which the worker has no part, and in relation to the stage of
development reached by society in general.” [42]
Marx claims that in capitalism technological progress will not increase with the real
wage commensurately because capitalists intentionally depress the real wage by
“increasing the competition among workers and weakening their bargaining
position”[43]. They achieve this goal by introducing labor-saving innovations to
displace labor by capital. This effect can be demonstrated by Josef Steindl’s model in
his Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism:
“Assume that technological progress proceeds, involving a continuous increase
in net real output per worker employed, and that the ratio of capital invested to
net output remains constant. Net output and capital invested therefore grow at
the same rate, and this rate is, on our assumptions, greater than the rate of
growth of labour force employed. Thus, if we assume a given trend rate of
growth of capital, the rate of growth of employment must fall short of it; the
difference will be simply determined by the increase in productivity per unit of
time.”[44]
However, this cannot be Marx’s entire argument. Since the model is based solely on
the assumption of a given trend rate of accumulation – which is given by Marx at the
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very beginning – if the ratio of capital invested to net product is constant, there will be
an increasing rate of accumulation. This observation counters his first assumption. It
is therefore essential to assume an increase in the ratio of capital invested to net
product. This argument, as a supplement to his previous conclusion, shows that
capitalists intentionally sacrifice the efficiency of their capital by replacing labor with
capital under the name of innovation in order to maintain their product share.
The assumption of “an increase in the ratio of capital invested to net product” is in
fact quite vulnerable to empirical data from modern capitalism. Steindl shows that the
ratio of net business capital to national product does not seem to have increased at all
since the first decade of the century. In addition, the share of labor in the product does
not show any marked tendency to fall in the later stages of capitalism. In my opinion,
Marx’ conclusion does not conform to empirical data although not due to his
argument of “an increasing share of capital in the net product”. Instead, it might result
from the fact that Marx’s conclusion is obtained in a steady growth model where
consumers’ taste and the relative importance of capital to labor in production remain
constant. In reality though, our economy experiences substantial transformational
growth during this period. That is to say, the capitalist inefficiencies central to Marx’s
analysis might be overshadowed by positive exogenous forces.

Marx provides a lot of insights into the distribution problem associated with
capitalism, but his criticism fails to arouse attention in capitalist societies for many
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reasons. The most important reason is that Marx’s ideas challenge the principles of
capitalism and stand against the interests of the capitalist-class.
Why are capitalists so dominant in determining the distribution pattern in
capitalism? Marx partly supplies the answer. First, as the accumulation of capital
proceeds, wealth is gradually centralized in the hands of fewer and fewer capitalists.
This occurs because “the very process of accumulation will lead to dispossession of
small proprietors, and bring new recruits into the army of industrial workers” [40]. On
the other hand, the real wage has difficulty increasing since capitalists keep
innovating in order to displace labor by capital. As a result, the relative abundance of
labor to capital has the tendency to increase. Labor, therefore, must compete for
limited capital. Second, the increasing complexity of the production process raises the
importance of capitals to labor as production factors. While capital is getting more
independent in production, laborers can hardly produce any modern products without
capitals. Finally, the endowment discrepancy between the two classes makes labor
more desperate to work than capitalists to invest. If capitalists stop producing there is
no problem to secure their lives for a long period of time considering the wealth they
own. But if laborers stop working they have no means of payment and thus are
isolated from social exchange.
Till now, our discussion of distribution has been confined to the production side.
However, the purpose of this thesis is not about social justice, but how to cure
involuntary unemployment associated with under-consumption. In the following part,
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I will turn to the demand side and show why sharply unequal distribution is
responsible for under-consumption in capitalism.

2. Its affect on consumption demand
If every single person (no matter what class they belong to) is able to utilize their
income in a similar way, there will be little reason to discuss distribution. The change
of distribution will not affect the aggregate demand pattern. However, people’s
economic behaviors not only vary with income, but are also characterized by their
social class. Hence income discrepancy among different social classes will seriously
affect the overall consumption and investment pattern.
According to Keynes’ psychological law of consumption the marginal propensity to
consume will stay constant or fall with a rise of income. In addition, we know that the
average propensity to consume is lower for higher income households. This law
implicitly expresses the idea that more consumption will be motivated if wealth can
be distributed more evenly, which can be easily obtained from the following
inequality:

(a<b), where

is the deviation from even distribution,

a is the average propensity to consume above evenly distributed income, and b is the
average propensity to consume below evenly distributed income. If Keynes is right
about this psychological law of consumption, a capitalist system will under consume.
As a result, increasing investment required by capitalists might not be fulfilled.
Sweezy also expounds upon this idea:

65

“As long as the national income rises at a constant rate, or a declining one, the
capital stock should also rise at a constant rate, or, or even only at a declining
rate, to assure full utilization. But a continuous rise in national income involves
a rise in surplus value, and a fortiori a rise in the rate of investment. Now a rise
in the rate of investment, of course, implies that the capital stock will not grow
in a linear fashion, but at an increasing rate: which clearly cannot be reconciled
with the requirement of full utilization”.[45]
This argument implies an increasing discrepancy between effective demand and
production capacity.

To justify Keynes’s psychological law of consumption, we need to refer to David
Levine’s consumption theory. My previous arguments have shown that needs are
finite and thus can be satisfied. However, there is an exception---the need for “more
wealth”.
“When being wealthy becomes an end in itself, independent of any structure of
need, the finiteness of need breaks down. If the idea of acquiring wealth in
order to be as wealthy as possible becomes an element of my personality
structure, then my need for wealth can never be satisfied since it does not fix
upon a discrete group of useful objects”,[46]
Thus the need for more wealth can only be satisfied by degree. Capitalism in fact
provides a favorable environment for the capitalist class to cultivate such a personality
structure. Not only do wealthy people enjoy a higher social status, but the distribution
pattern gives them the opportunity to become even wealthier through capital
accumulation. Some small capitalists indeed are driven out of business by
competitions, but others grow quickly. They even get privileges in production from
exclusive cost advantage, which facilitates further accumulation. It is not hard to
imagine that as the accumulation process continues (and wealth concentrates) the
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needs (being wealthier) of few (capitalists) trump the consumption needs of the many
(laborers). Capitalists gradually lose their interests in consumption because most of
their needs associated with consumption have already been satisfied or become much
less important in their lifestyle. Their obsession with wealth let them forget the
meaning of wealth because wealth for them no longer relates to any regular
consumption. But the continuation of investment and production becomes the primary
mission during the process of chasing higher social status.
Thorstein Veblen in his book The Theory of the Leisure Class provide a similar idea
by arguing that the economic life of the leisure class (the ruling class) driven not by
consumptions associated with regular needs, but by putting their reputability and
opulence in evidence by their consumption pattern.[47] Such purpose of consumption,
if we lend support to Levine’s idea, comes from the fact that the leisure class’s
integrity of personality relies on the acknowledgement of their superior social status
by the society, which is consistent with Levine’s argument about the pursuit of wealth
by the capitalists. However, Veblen further concludes that a great amount of
conspicuous consumption from the leisure class will be motivated with the purpose of
demonstrating status through showing how much wealth they have. This standpoint to
some extent contradicts my previous argument since the motive for conspicuous
consumption is not to satisfy wants and needs, but consumption as part of effective
demand is nonetheless emphasized. To clear this confusion, we need to notice that
Veblen’s argument is based on his study of primitive tribe life. (He also thinks that
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modern society inherits some of its features, thus much of today’s society is a
variation on early tribal life.) In primitive society, conspicuous consumption, such as
using precious metal, might be the only way for leisure class to show off their wealth,
thus demonstrating their superior social status. The same thing is indeed still
happening in modern capitalism but its importance becomes much weaker. As the
development of financial markets, money gradually displaces real goods as the
measurement of wealth thus conspicuous consumption is no longer essential for
flaunting wealth. Assets as numbers in bank accounts also count. In addition, the
advanced mass media in modern capitalism allow a higher social status associated
with more wealth to be acknowledged by others even if wealth exists in an intangible
form. (A magazine called Forbes dedicates itself to revealing the richest people on the
earth and the unit that it uses to measure personal asset is dollar.) On the other hand,
the ideology of primitive tribal society discussed by Veblen is fundamentally different
from that of capitalism. The pursuit of higher social status in early tribal life was
achieved mostly by conquest of some tribes over others. However in modern
capitalism, the pursuit of higher social status is mostly associated with wealth in
money term rather than physical power or ownership of women. It is achieved by
capital accumulation through reproduction process. Since conspicuous consumption is
no longer an effective way to flaunt wealth and the pursuit of higher social status and
more wealth can only be accomplished through investments, the motive of
conspicuous consumption in capitalism is much less strong than that in pre-industrial
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times. Conspicuous consumption cannot save capitalism from the under-consumption
problem.
The concentration of wealth is also accompanied with “the power to command” as
wealthy people can determine the dispose of wealth. For example, large shareholders
can independently make business decisions without listening to those of small
shareholders. The accumulation of wealth trumps that of consumption while small
shareholders are forced to follow suit in the quest for profit.
According to our previous argument investment and production, without enough
consumption to realize final products, are unsustainable. Moreover, the unrealized
part of investment brings another severe efficiency problem into our analysis of
capitalism – excess capacity.

3. Excess capacity and idle capitals
The Kuznets curve indicates the relationship between inequality and growth over a
specified time period of capitalist development. Obviously, the left half of this curve
is consistent with Marx’s criticism because it illustrates a rising inequality of
distribution over the development of capitalism. However, the other half tells a
different story. It suggests that the maturity of capitalism will reduce the inequality of
distribution because there is a tendency for profits to fall relative to real wage. Does
this necessarily mean that capitalism is able to cure its distribution problem in the
process of its maturity? The answer is no. That profits fall relative to the real wage
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does not demonstrate a shift in actual income from capitalists to workers. Instead, it
falls because of a shift in the potential income of workers to excess capacity due to a
reduced degree of investment utilization. Although national income does increase, the
negative effects of excess capacity on the aggregate economy could be overshadowed
by technological progresses or transformational growth. That is to say if capitalism is
running with less excess capacity it can potentially perform much better.
What then is excess capacity? Excess capacity is the amount of productive capacity
generated by fixed factors above the amount required by market demand. In other
words, it is the capital assets that cannot be utilized in production due to insufficient
product demand. Excess capacity in mature capitalism causes productive labor, which
can be varied while fixed capacity cannot be varied, to become idle. The
disadvantages of holding excess capacity are quite obvious: 1. It raises the current
cost of new investment deterring new competitors and weakening competition; 2. It
increase the costs of operation (maintenance of equipment, etc) whereby raising
production costs and prices; 3. It drives down the wage level and weakens the demand
from working class; 4. Resources are wasted on idle production factors that are not
productive. But with all these obvious disadvantages, why do capitalists still hold a
large portion of excess capacity?
The most popular argument is associated with the fluctuation in demand and
competition. If producers are not able to expand production when the economy is
booming but his competitors can, he will lose his market share. While the majority of
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producers in the market choose to hold excess capacity, the opportunity cost of
foregoing such a decision is bigger than holding excess capacity itself. Moreover,
there are two general reasons: 1. It is believed that new producers will face a
“restricted market” as it takes time to advertise and earn consumers’ trusts. The
growth of the market needs to allow for new producers to meet the conditions of a full
market even though initial demand is much lower than designed capacity; 2. The
indivisibility and durability of plant and equipment make gradual expansion of
capacity with the growth of the market unfeasible. When the market is growing and
demand is increasing, physically limited production will prove deleterious. In this
case, an expansion of capacity might be achieved by relocating the business, replacing
expansive equipments or even rehiring staff, all of which take a tremendous amount
of times and loss of a “lifetime business opportunity”. Producers are willing to hold
excess capacity at the beginning in order to avoid such an occurrence.
The deliberate holding of excess capacity cannot be entirely regarded as a waste
caused by imperfect competition since the fluctuations of demand in capitalism
require elastic supply. Thus, the problem of short term excess capacity is usually
solved in the long run. But our problem is that mature capitalism can generate excess
capacity beyond simply dealing with demand fluctuations. It will increase to the level
where further investment and employment deteriorates while current production
suffers from low efficiency.
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There are generally two reasons for such an occurrence: First, in a perfectly
competitive market as defined by the neoclassical school, there is a natural rate of
profit (or rate of interest) across industries. Competitions will depress this rate as low
as possible. In this situation, little space is left to small producers to carry out price
cuts for fear of taking a loss. However, as capitalism develops, some producers gain
exclusive cost advantages through innovation or production privilege. They are then
able to drive out marginal producers via price competition. The maturity of capitalism
is therefore characterized by oligopolistic market conditions during the accumulation
process. A small number of producers in every industry then would be capable of
controlling price. In addition, oligarchs have a quite weak incentive to gain more
market share through price cuts. If their competitors follow suit, no market share
could be obtained and the whole industry would experience a general surplus loss. In
mature capitalism, therefore, the profit margin for oligopoly producers is quite high.
High profit margin means a low income share for laborers whereby profits will have a
hard time being realized. As a result, a large portion of capital will be randomly
invested on expanding current productions which are quite saturated and
non-profitable for the reason that the process of accumulation requires nonstop
investing but there are not enough investment opportunities to absorb all the desperate
capitals. Excess capacity is in fact a result of the failure of effective demand.
Moreover, it will increase with a rise in the profit margin along with an increasing
income discrepancy between capitalist and working classes.
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The other reason for undesired excess capacity is associated with the generosity of
the banking system. New producers are inexperienced. They only have limited
knowledge about the market they face. But they are sanguine about their business and
usually have the typical capitalists’ personality in heart – more is better. They often
prefer growing to steady businesses so as to enlarge capacity. The scale is thus
physically limited by initial funds. If new investments are financed by their
endowments, investors’ ambitions might be to some extent restrained by the fear of
losing everything. However, if new investments are financed by the banking system,
the amount of credit will set the scale of productions. If their businesses succeed they
will be the biggest beneficiaries from leverage. If they fail, on the other hand, they can
walk away. However, in capitalism, “upon reaching the stage of maturity, there
becomes agglomerations of finance seeking investment outlets.”[48] The banking
system, as a big pool of those desperate capitals, must be generous on credit for every
potential opportunity that allows capitals to grow, but the problem of
under-consumption in modern capitalism will set the limit on available investing
opportunities in the market. However, when an economic downturn begins, the
banking system will be under-willing to supply any funds even for healthy
investments, thus accelerating the advent of recession.
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Steady growth, Transformational growth, and the Development of needs
Certain facets of capitalism have their strong suits. The pursuit of wealth based on
private property has been historically proven as an influential motive of economic
development. Capitalism, with its superior stimulation mechanism, is able to provide
effective transformational growth, which is essential for production to keep pace with
the development of individually determined needs.
If we open an average economics textbook and come across some theories about
economic growth, they oftentimes imply steady growth.
“Steady growth means ‘straightforward swelling-up’, with no new products or
processes. It is growth in which everything becomes larger in absolute size due
to a rise of productivity. Of course there is more income, but the income is
distributed in the same way among labor and capitalists”.[49]
For the sake of achieving steady growth, economic models are utilized. But is steady
growth really what modern capitalism needs in the long run? Unfortunately
economics concentrates on less important but more tractable questions at the expense
of more fundamental concerns. The capitalistic system is unable to sustain a long run
“steady growth” because pure steady growth must end in stagnation.
The first problem with steady growth concerns consumption. A reduction in price
will not necessarily motivate current consumers to consume more of the same good
associated with certain needs. Nevertheless, a rise in income or a fall in price, as a
result of steady growth, will motivate more aggregate demand anyway as higher grade
consumption becomes affordable to lower social classes. However, such a rise of
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demand in a capitalist system will not be proportioned to the growth of production for
three reasons: First, capitalism encourages an increasing income discrepancy between
the capitalist class and the working class. A steady growth will bring a relatively small
amount of wealth to working class while increasing wealth for owners of capital. With
large income discrepancy a moderate steady growth will not make higher grade
consumption any more affordable as the increment of workers’ incomes is too small to
overcome the “grades” among different consumptions. To overcome such big gaps
requires the steady growth to be enormous, which is hard to achieve in the short run.
The second reason is associated with “needs”. If we use extreme criterion from the
perspective of production, all the products can be classified into two categories: one is
resource-intensive (luxuries); the other is efficiency-intensive (necessities). The
production of resource-intensive commodities will not be affected by a steady growth
because its production is dependent on a non-growing resource. With an inelastic
supply a steady growth will bid up the price of resource-intensive products increasing
its relative scarcity. Meanwhile, steady growth will substantially decrease the price of
efficiency-intensive commodities because its production efficiency will be improved.
But in mature capitalism the consumption of efficiency-intensive goods is already
quite saturated. A reduction in price will not encourage more consumption because
needs associated with those products have been satisfied and consumptions beyond
such a point are unnecessary. For example, a steady growth will reduce the price of a
Honda Accord (or cars of the same class) because of a more efficient production
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process. But it will not tremendously boost the sale because everyone who needs cars
as a mean of transportation in the U.S already possesses one. A steady growth will
even raise the price of a Lamborghini Murcielago because its production is so limited
by resources – rare metals, high-class leather and top engineers. With an inelastic
supply, consumption physically cannot grow. In both cases, consumption fails to grow
in a steady manner. Finally, steady growth is not capable of catching up with the
development of personality in the long run. As we know, steady growth brings no new
consumption potential. If the new mode of life stimulated by the development of our
personalities requires consumptions that current products cannot provide, the demand
of current products physically cannot increase with an overall quantitative growth.
The other problem with steady growth is associated with investment. If neither new
products nor new processes are being introduced by a steady growth, the same
products will be continuously produced by the same equipments and stuffs, under the
same management and building. Even if new investments are required to expand
current production, the majority of previous investments will be kept since under the
same production process, it is unnecessary to replace them. Thus a steady growth does
not require as many new investments as transformational growth does.
While steady growth ends in stagnation, transformational growth can not only boost
the consumption of current products, but also expand the market in multiple directions.
Transformational growth is characterized by innovations on products. New products
and processes bring about a new principle of life, which can be applied in a variety of
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contexts to encourage more innovation consumption. Hence, the development of
individually determined needs is enhanced by the sustainable and self-motivated
character of transformational growth. In other words, transformational growth is able
to constantly create new needs and help/guide individual achieve new modes of life.
Moreover, new products and processes will partly replace old ones thus creating new
fields for investment. With different production processes new equipments, new
plants and even new workers are required, thus providing catalyst for investment. In
this situation, if workers are replaced it is an opportunity to replace inefficient
workers with more efficient workforces as seniorities are no longer useful in such a
new production environment, hence production efficiency is also enhanced. More
importantly, an epoch-making innovation under transformational growth will not only
induce the investment for itself, but create multiple new fields for investment thus
once again shows its feature of self-motivation. Transformational growth will also
change the pattern of income distribution via the abundance and importance of labor
to capital in the production process. The tendency of current transformational growth
is characterized by the internet and social networks. This indicates an increasing
importance of human intelligence and relationships to “machines” in the production
process. When capital becomes a more abundant factor to labor in the production
process, the distribution pattern will shift to labor thereby narrowing the income
discrepancy between capitalists and laborers. Even if growth temporarily returns to a
steady rate, more consumption will be stimulated due to the emergence of larger
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middle classes of consumers. This redistribution of wealth might be the most
important reason why transformational growth is required.

A Dilemma
Transformational growth is not a cure for under-consumption in mature capitalism.
It will surely (to some extent) mitigate it, but not enough to assure constant
consumption demand required by capitalists. The problematic distribution pattern in
capitalism is overlooked because the economy is still growing, even at a fast pace
during some periods. But very few economists have mentioned what the economy
could be like if such a problem did not exist. It should grow at a faster pace providing
better life for everyone with less discrimination and crime, and with much less
economic fluctuations. Indeed, if transformational growth can be maintained at a high
level the demand deficit caused by the distribution problem will to some extent be
overshadowed by our technological progress. But transformational growth itself is
quite limited and volatile. In most case such growth is triggered by unexpected
discoveries and innovations which are not controllable. No doubt that technological
progress will encourage transformational growth, but improvement of technology is
also a result of compound efforts. A better education will definitely help it develop,
but there is no guarantee that certain achievements will surely be done if investment is
made in education. In addition, the outcome of investment on education takes a long
time to be seen, so if all producers are waiting for a cutting edge technology to show
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up, they will die before it actually happens. It is just not wise to solely rely on
“unpredictable” and “unsustainable” transformational growth to save us from
stagnation. The distribution problem is always there, dragging our economy backward
regardless how much effort we make on improving technology. Unfortunately, solving
the distribution problem in capitalism will prove to be quite difficult. Ultimately, we
obtain an idea of what capitalism could be. If the distribution pattern has to change,
new social structure might be required. But there are not any available social
structures which have a stimulation mechanism quite like capitalism. Hence we are
caught in a dilemma – a just distribution pattern or a superior stimulation mechanism.
If we have to keep capitalism, the only thing I believe can help our economy
consistently prosper is to expect every capitalist can commit them to charity and at the
same time pursuing “wealth” as desperately as before, which obviously will never
happen; or we could tax them heavily, which also won’t happen since most of our
governors are capitalists themselves.
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Summary
I started my research within the neoclassical system but the results disappointed me.
Very few contents about the theory of employment can be found since neoclassical
economists think that unemployment should be voluntary, thus it is not a social
problem. Its conclusion is opposite to what we experience in the modern economy,
thus there has to be something wrong with their assumptions. The answer is found in
Keynes’ The General Theory: The utility of the real wage might not be the sole
determinant of labor supply and more importantly, Say’s law and even Marshall’s
equilibrium model suffer from mistakes.
The problem with Say’s law is quite obvious if we lend support to Keynes’ idea
because if money is not neutral then Say’s law will not hold. In Marshal’s price model,
I don’t see any problems from the production side because the production and
distribution pattern is supposed to be arranged in that way in capitalism. So the
problem has to come from the demand side.
My biggest concern with the neoclassical theory of consumption is the arguments
associated with “want and its satisfaction”. To neoclassical economists, wants are
formless. Individuals want something not for its particular or distinctive qualities but
the “utility” generated from their consumptions. Moreover, individual’s wants are
infinite in a very strong sense and thus can only be satisfied by a degree. In this case,
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the situation of under-consumption is logically impossible to occur in free markets.
However, it is quite hard for me to believe these ideas after I reflected my own
consumption behaviors and also studied others’. I can hardly find any similarities to
these arguments. Moreover, the neoclassical model cannot apply to the involuntary
unemployment phenomenon in modern capitalism. So I abandoned the neoclassical
framework and looked for an alternative solution.
I believe Keynes has provided the right framework to study the economy at the
macro level. He thinks national income and the employment level are determined by
the effective demand, which consists of consumption and desired investment.
However, the effective demand associated with full employment is a special case so
the maximum capacity of an economy can only exist by accident or design. Therefore,
the neoclassical conclusion that the free market can automatically achieve maximum
capacity, which is based on the assumption of formless and infinite wants, is incorrect.
Economic performance always fluctuates with the change in effective demands.
The consumption theory from David Levine makes much more sense to me so in my
thesis I borrowed his idea to reexamine the demand problem. First of all, Levine
replaces the word “want” with “need” because the idea of “wants” is absent of the
force of necessity, thus allow people to make arbitrary consumption decision based on
random whims or preferences. In addition, Levine’s needs are quite different from the
classical idea of “needs” which is only associated with subsistence. According to
Levine’s arguments, individual’s distinctive personality has integrity, which means
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individual has his own unique attitudes to the world and a realization of himself that
he wants to preserve through time. It motivates or forces this person into a certain
mode of life, through which the specific structure of his personality expresses and
realizes itself. Thus, needs are the requirements for maintaining the integrity of our
being as unique individuals and its force of necessity is shown as serious damages on
our personalities if needs fail to be satisfied. We call needs in this sense “individually
determined needs”.
Based on Levine’s explanation, the situation of under-consumption can be perfectly
explained from two perspectives: First, needs are finite and satiable. In addition, each
need requires specific means of consumption. Hence, if markets fail to provide all the
means required by our desired modes of life, some of our needs would remain
unsatisfied while some other products in the market are too abundant for us. Second,
even if the production is potentially able to satisfy every need that the society has, a
sharply unequal distribution can create scarcity in the presence of wealth. This is the
part that Keynes didn’t answer for us. In Keynes’ system, we can clearly see that he
realize that involuntary employment attributes to weak effective demand, or more
precisely under-consumption, but he failed to tell why in capitalism there is a demand
problem. This deeper problem is overlooked because the potential for government to
greatly counter economic downturns is one that is much exaggerated by Keynes.
Unfortunately, the current economic downturn in the United States, at least I
believe, is caused by both of the reasons. The distribution problem looks much harder
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for us to deal with because it comes from the capitalist production structure and even
the ideology of capitalism.
According to Marx, the primary goal of capitalism is to assure a certain long-run
rate of accumulation. That is to say, in capitalism, profit is the only reason for
production. Wages, which to a large extent determine the happiness of the
working-class, is not as important and thus should be adjusted freely so as to make the
rate of capital accumulation possible. The real wage is able to rise with the
development of capitalism but it can never rise proportionately to the increase in the
productivity of labor. Moreover, in order to weaken the bargaining position of the
working class for the sake of ensuring their product share, capitalists keep introducing
labor-saving innovations to displace labor by capital, even at the cost of efficiency
loss. This production format and distribution pattern result in a huge income
discrepancy between the working-class and the capitalist-class.
The distribution problem will not bother the neoclassical system because according
to the idea of infinite wants and the utility theory income discrepancy as a result of
capital accumulation has little effect on consumption demand. However, as we have
seen in Levine’s argument, finite needs will set the limit on consumption demand. In
addition, Keynes claims that the propensity to consume for wealthy people is much
lower than that of poor ones, which further weaken the aggregate consumption
demand in capitalism. The answer to this phenomenon is once again found within
Levine’s framework. Levine believes that although needs are generally finite and
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satiable, there is an exception – the need for more wealth. This need is in fact the
primary one of capitalists according to the ideology of capitalism. Consequently, the
capitalist-class, who owns the majority of the national wealth, is much more interested
in investment than consumption since investment is the only way that allows their
capitals to grow. However, without enough consumption demand, investment can
never be sustained. In addition, weak consumption demand will generate an efficiency
problem called excess capacity. The existence of excess capacity at undesired levels is
actually a direct result of a weak aggregate consumption demand with desperate
aggregate demand of investment caused by a big income discrepancy.
However, the pursuit of wealth based on private property in capitalism has been
historically proven as an influential stimulation mechanism for transformational
growth. Steady growth will finally end in stagnation but transformational growth is
able to match up with the development of our personality thus constantly stimulating
consumption demand. So we become trapped in a dilemma, a just distribution pattern
or a superior stimulation mechanism. The situation of under-consumption due to the
distribution problem is the inherent weakness of capitalism which cannot be solved
within its structure. So we have to rely on how much transformational growth can
drag us out from this big hole. My final conclusion is a little disappointing because I
don’t foresee that the involuntary unemployment and economic fluctuations can be
permanently cured in capitalism. Maybe a more advanced social structure is required
for a better economy.
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